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Abstract
The analysis of farmers’ decision making process in the framework of agricultural policy is particularly 
complex as they take action within a structure of interacting opportunities, preferences, benefits and social 
factors which ultimately account for their behavior. This paper will study viticulturists’ behaviour vis-à-vis 
this scenario. Their decisions in the face of different possible alternatives are analysed using a multinomial 
logit model and a sample of 74,502 plots in Castilla-La Mancha (Spain). The conclusion is that viticulturists 
from this region are more prone to maintaining the status quo in their plots due to the current public support 
security issues, uncertain scenarios and their natural risk aversion.
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1. Introduction
The European Union regulation in the wine growing sector has experienced a number of changes and 
adaptations throughout the period of integration of the Common Market. The latest general change in general 
regulation for the wine sector dates from 2008; the Council Regulation (EC) No. 479/2008 (EC, 2008) 
repealed direct market intervention (distillations and grape must aid programs), which promoted temporary 
adjustment (grubbing up), as well as changes in vineyard planting rights regulation as from 2015. The specific 
case of this liberalization process was later reconsidered in the June 2013 political agreement on the reform 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the 2014-2020 period, which made planting restrictions 
possible through new decisions by administrative authorizations, though it put an end to their exchange rate 
in the transaction market, which completed the market freedom model with the end of distillations and the 
aforementioned structural adjustment. All this requires rigorous analyses in a context that allows for the 
discerning of the possible consequences this may cause. However, studies presenting an assessment of farm 
producers’ decisions in this context are still scarce.
Added to that, farmers’ decision making is a complex process. Studies, such as Gasson (1973), Smith and 
Capstick (1976), Perkin and Rehman (1994), Sumpsi et al. (1997), Berbel and Rodríguez (1998), Costa 
and Rehman (1999), Willock et al. (1999), Solano et al. (2001), Bergevoet et al. (2004), Eastwood et al. 
(2012), Kanellopoulos et al. (2012), Leach et al. (2012) and Lybbert et al. (2012), all share the conclusion 
that when it comes to making decisions, farm producers take into account not only profit expectation but 
also the correct timing to make said decisions as well as a series of further considerations related to their 
economic, social, cultural and environmental context. Thus, the factors affecting farm producers’ decision 
making on managing options and the risks inherent to that process have generated an extensive literature in 
recent years (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). Engler and Toledo (2010), Jones (2006), Moran et al. (2007) 
and Toledo et al. (2011) have pointed out the impact of farmers’ socio-demographic characteristics, such 
as educational level, age and gender (McRoberts et al., 2011; Nainggolan et al., 2013) on their decision 
making. An additional component is the degree of risk aversion of farm producers themselves, which is 
underlined by authors, such as Engler and Toledo (2010) and Girdžiūté (2012). Along with these decision 
makers’ characteristics, further structural factors are relevant, namely land ownership and membership in 
producer organizations (Engler and Toledo, 2010; Nainggolan et al., 2013). Economic determinants as well 
as those affecting business profits when it comes to making decisions are also important, as McRoberts et al. 
(2011), Moran et al. (2007), Nainggolan et al. (2013), Sattler and Nagel (2010) and Teschner et al. (2013) 
point out, as is receiving different types of subsidies (Nainggolan et al., 2013).
That said, following Riesgo and Gómez-Limón (2006), farm producers will make decisions in such a way as 
to satisfy to the extent possible all their objectives taking into account all the relevant factors. Therefore, the 
main objective of this study is to analyze wine producers’ decision making process from a global perspective, 
taking into account various factors (structural, market, geographical, social) and the European regulatory 
policy framework (measured by aid received). In terms of this latter aspect, as stated by Garrido (2006) and 
Riesgo and Gómez-Limón (2006), farm producers are the actors who ultimately receive the corresponding 
programs and as such the success or failure of these programs depends on farmers. Subjects’ actions are 
taken within an opportunity structure interacting with their preference schemes, thus accounting for their 
behavior. In other words, whether or not farm producers decide to adhere to programs will be the result of 
the combination of their preference scheme (formed by their values and attitudes in relation to changes in 
agriculture and agricultural policy) and the structure within which they take action (Garrido, 2006).
The wine sector is not immune to this process. In recent years, as a result of the entry into force of CAP 
regulations in the European Community through the 2008 Common Market Organisation (CMO), this sector 
has witnessed a normative adaptation which greatly affects farm producers’ decisions in relation to their 
holdings (among many other dimensions), especially those regulations related to structural aspects such as 
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growing areas device or vineyard restructuring and reconversion aid scheme). Added to this, there are further 
structural, spatial, market and social determinants which also affect farmers’ decision making process.
This research will present a logit multinomial model which, following Cabrer et al. (2001), will allow an 
analysis of economic agents’ behavior by capturing the level of probability of certain factors affecting their 
decision making process. This study specifically formulates a Logit Multinomial Model whose data comes 
from the Castilla-La Mancha region (Spain) and the material amounts to a sample of 74,502 plots with 
information provided by the Junta de Castilla-La Mancha 2012 Vineyard Register.
2. Theoretical framework
Literature review
Agricultural policy as public sector action – and public policy in general – have for decades been a decisive 
factor in the decision making process of farm producers and agents involved in the agri-food sector. Following 
Garrido (2006), the different actors in this sector, i.e. administrations, farming organizations and farmers 
themselves have been adopting positions on the matter and have transferred the regulation measures and 
instruments to the strategies they adopt. That said, it is true that farmers are the final beneficiaries and as 
such they decide to accede to any given specific program freely and on an individual basis. It is equally 
true that the decision making process is affected by multiple factors, some of them related to instrumental 
rationales (e.g. the appeal of direct aid) and others based on value-oriented rationales (e.g. the reduction of 
the negative impact of their technology model of choice). Profit maximization, the economic, social, cultural 
and environmental context and the timing of decision making should also be added to the list (Riesgo and 
Gomez-Limon, 2006).
Research on farm producers’ decision making process in different sectors regulated by European agrarian policy 
has been a constant across the EU. In the dairy sector, highly affected by the quota system due to the delayed 
implementation of the quotas, Giannakas and Fulton (2000) show that farm producers take an opportunistic 
course of action in relation to agricultural policy measures. Their paper introduces misrepresentation and 
cheating into the policy analysis of output quotas and subsidies. Analytical results show that when cheating 
occurs output quotas are a less efficient means of income redistribution than is traditionally believed. 
Furthermore, cheating increases the transfer efficiency of output subsidies. The result is that an all-or-nothing 
choice between quotas and subsidies will generally favor the use of subsidies. A combination of quotas 
and subsidies, however, usually remains the most efficient means of income redistribution through market 
intervention. Helming and Peerlings (2002) also study the dairy sector and conclude that the abolition of 
the milk quota system in the Netherlands would result in dairy farmers increasing the number of milking 
cows. Jongeneel and Tonini (2009) conclude that farmers’ response capacities in terms of milk production is 
related to its price. The results in Kempen et al. (2011) show that if quotas were abolished, milk production 
in the EU would increase by more than 4%. Another study by Laepple and Hennessy (2012) notes that milk 
production depends of the real prices of milk.
In terms of the sugar sector, also highly determined by the laying out of production quotas, the study by Nolte 
et al. (2012) concludes that farmers would increase production if the world market price went up. An analysis 
carried out by Rabobank (2013) shows that the abolition of sugar quotas in the EU in 2017 is expected to 
cause an increase in sugar production in the EU, which would also increase competition amongst suppliers.
As to water, the basic input whose regulation is determining for farmers as they tailor the use of it according 
to said regulation, Jiménez et al. (2001) carried out an analysis of the impact that an increasing price of water 
would have in two irrigation zones. The comparison of the two communities studied show that irrigation 
aversion does not seem to be constant in farmers but rather has a clear relationship with property structure. 
Arriaza et al. (2002) conclude that irrigators’ behavior derives from the maximization of a utility function 
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of water at subsidized prices has caused an increase in water consumption. Giannoccaro and Berbel (2011) 
point out that a CAP reform would have little impact on farmers’ decisions related to water usage due to the 
decoupling of aids to production.
Finally, it is essential to note that economic, social and environmental dimensions do not have the same effects 
on farmers’ decision making (e.g. CAP agri-environmental measures). Garrido (2006) concludes that when it 
comes to farmers’ preference schemes in relation to agri-environmental policy, the overarching principle is an 
instrumental rationale; the programs are valued as opportunities to boost income. The economic dimension 
generally dominates farmers’ preferences whereas other dimensions, such as the social and environmental 
ones, have little or no impact.
Therefore, although the economic dimension is indeed an important factor in decision making, the complexity 
of this process for farmers within the framework of public regulation and the different factors affecting them 
is nonetheless revealed as, following Freije and Rodríguez (1993), making a decision involves a reflection 
process which needs to take into account the pros and cons of the action alternatives and tries to opt for 
the more efficient one according to the objectives pursued. Now, as stated by Garrido (2006), taking a 
unidimensional approach which focuses solely on the economic dimension as the driving force in farmers’ 
decisions is insufficient in terms of accounting for the complex and heterogeneous agriculture reality seen 
as a space of production and sociocultural reproduction. If we bear in mind the increasingly multi-functional 
task attributed to farmers, it is our belief that a multi-dimensional approach (considering multiple factors) 
to their preference schemes is the most appropriate in the current context.
In the case of the wine sector there are a few minor previous actions but so far exclusively related to the impact 
of the potential liberalization of planting rights (AEWR-UMR MOISA (2012), the European Parliament 
(2012), COPA-COGECA (2012) and the Report commissioned to the High Level Panel (2013). Furthermore, 
the paper by Deconinck and Swinnen (2013) provides a theoretical analysis of the economic effects and the 
social implications of planting rights. A model is proposed which takes into account land and production, 
trade restrictions and regional and national reserves. The model shows that liberalization creates winners 
and losers. Among the winners we find consumers, who benefit from larger wine supplies at lower rates. 
Owners of land other than vineyards also win due to the increase in land prices. A third group of winners are 
the new entrants in the sector, who will have the opportunity to plant vineyards. The losers are the owners 
of the original vineyards since the total value of their vineyards decreases and, furthermore, they face lower 
prices. Therefore, we believe it essential to carry out this research focusing on a multidimensional vision of 
farm producers’ reactions to public regulation measures within the framework of the wine CMO.
Theoretical model
As is the case with other agri-food sectors, public policy is a key element to understanding wine producers’ 
behavior when it comes to defining their management system. Throughout the 20th century the Spanish 
wine sector was subject to administrative regulations banning, promoting or regulating wine production, 
marketing and consumption. Then, when Spain signed the Accession Treaty to the European Community in 
1986, the sector regulation and the CAP regulation became common to the twelve countries already in the 
European integration process by that year. Almost 30 years after that, the different actors in the European 
Community have been taking different positions, which are revealed in their discourses and strategies and 
in how they put them into practice through the corresponding policies (Garrido, 2006). It is thus essential 
to analyze and find out how the decision making process unfolds and study producers’ behavior in terms of 
probability to define, as this research does, the most likely decision that farmers will make.
The decisions that farmers can adopt are strongly affected by European Union public regulation and are 
based on the premises in the 2008 CMO (EC, 2008), which sets out the guidelines for farmer behaviour. The 
deterioration of the balance between supply and demand in the wine sector, structural surpluses and lack 
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(statement of intentions). The first one pursues improvement in competitiveness, promoting quality through 
the production of higher value added wines and the use of oenological practices. The second pillar is the 
control of the productive potential to achieve balance between supply and demand cutting out distillation as 
a way out for surplus production, and setting out a specific date to remove the restriction on planting rights, 
which is one of our main concerns in this study. The third generic instrument is market intervention through 
promotion in third country markets. A fourth block aims at strengthening the social fabric in rural areas and 
guaranteeing environmental protection. In June 2013, the establishment of administrative authorizations for 
new vineyard plantations was announced in the framework of the political agreement on the PAC reform 
for the 2014-2020 period to substitute for the current rights as of 2016 (EC, 2013a). This announcement 
again stresses the importance of assessing potential decisions on the part of producers, which is the main 
objective of our study.
In an attempt to achieve all these goals in compliance with the regulations, a series of proposals were issued 
for farmers to choose from for their vineyards: (1) abandonment; (2) planting (provided they had planting 
rights or had acquired rights before the deadline for acquiring them and subsequent liberalisation); (3) 
grubbing up; and (4) restructuring. Articles 91 to 94 refer to planting and Chapter 3, to grubbing up (EC, 
2008). Both options aim to achieve a balance between supply and demand of quality wine. The restructuring 
in Article 11 intended to increase producers’ competitiveness (EC, 2008). If local conditions in farmers’ plots 
are not conducive to viable production, they can also choose to abandon them. Article 68, which gives them 
an opportunity to cut costs and permanently withdraw these areas from wine production (EC, 2008). Faced 
with these options, the farmer can also choose to continue as usual (a 5th alternative). These five alternatives 
will make up a discrete dependent variable of the model described below.
Thus, we can state that the main hypotheses (MH) analysed in this paper hold that the decisions made by 
winegrowers are a function of:
MH1: structural characteristics of the vineyard (structural factors)
MH2: price behaviour in the Spanish and international market (market factors)
MH3: geographical location of the vineyards (geographical factors)
MH4: land tenure and holding systems (social factors)
MH5: payments received through the CAP measures (regulation)
Structural factors (MH1) are directly related to land characteristics such as size, destination of production 
(table or quality wine), year of situation, management innovation and registration in the regulatory council. 
The expected effect of these variables will vary: (a) in terms of size, the smaller plots are more likely to be 
abandoned (Montagut and Gogliotti, 2008); and (b) destination of production. The process of planting and 
restructuring is more likely to take place in designation of origin or Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) 
areas (Basque Government, 2012); (c) innovation. Innovating plots are more dynamic and less prone to be 
abandoned (Giannoccaro and Berbel, 2011); and (d) Farmers’ union membership would favour planting and 
restructuring (Giannocarro and Berbel, 2011).
The market variables (MH2) deemed adequate for the analysis are the reference price of wine and export 
price. Price is the basic factor here given that farmers’ income fosters vineyard development (HLP, 2013). 
Therefore, higher prices favor planting and restructuring and discourages abandonment and grubbing up.
The geographical variables (MH3) analyzed are location in a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) 
covered area and the population of the municipality where the plot is located. Geographical variables also 
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to more productive areas (HLP, 2013), and because of the risk of vineyard expansion beyond the delimited 
geographic PDO area (Basque Government, 2012). Therefore, the expected effect is an increase in plantations 
in delimited geographic PDO areas.
As to social variables (MH4), another key element in the current vineyard scenario, following Engler and 
Toledo (2010) and Naiggolan et al. (2013), we include type of holding, type of owner and land tenure system. 
There is a concern that the number of family businesses will decrease and a more intensive, industrial wine 
growing will emerge in the context of a production model based on family holdings which sustains economic 
activity and employment in rural areas (COPA-COGECA, 2012; HLP, 2013). Based on this, family holdings 
will most likely tend towards abandonment and grubbing up whereas the opposite will be the case with 
industrial units.
Finally, public regulation (MH5) should not be neglected. There are different opinions in this regard (Atance et 
al., 2001; Koráb, 2012) mainly because it raises producers’ expectations so they anticipate and accommodate 
their decisions and actions. Here we consider direct aid from the CAP as from the 2003 reform as regulation 
indicator. This variable could be expected to be either positive as in Cortignani and Severini (2011) and 
Giannoccaro and Berbel (2011) or hardly influential as noted by Nowicki et al. (2007; 2009).
The theoretical model proposed in this research is summarized in Figure 1, which shows the framework 
within which farmers can act, the decisions they can adopt and the factors which can potentially affect them. 
The determining variables, as previously pointed out, have been divided into five large groups: Structural, 
Market, Geographical, Social and Public Regulation. These groups were inserted in the model estimate 
and will allow us to assess the degree of impact and significance of each variable and their groups in the 
Figure 1. Determinants in decision making by producers. MH1, MH2, MH3, MH4, MH5 represent the 
incidence variables in the producers decision that sustain the hypotheses. DO = designation of origin, CMO 
= Common Market Organisation.
• Size of the plot
• Destination of the 
   production
• Age
• Innovation (variety + 
   management) 
• Member of a Regulatory 
   Council 
A. Structural
     (MH1)
Variables of grouped influence









• Reference grape prices
• Export price 
B. Market
     (MH2)
• Location/DO
• PopulationC. Geographical     (MH3)
• Type of operator
• Type of proprietor
• Tenure regime
D. Social
     (MH4)
• CMO  (distillations, 
   restructuring and 
   conversion, one-time
   payment, promotion)
E. Public 
     relations











































































International Food and Agribusiness Management Review
69
Castillo-Valero et al. Volume 20, Issue 1, 2017
face of the different options that emerge for farm producers in the new liberalising scenario: new planting, 
restructuring/converting, grubbing up, abandonment and status quo.
The characterisation of producers, as expected, is particularly heterogeneous, as is the structure of their 
holdings. Therefore, it is hard to conceive that their behaviour would be similar to that of a standard farmer. 
Different behaviours amongst farmers are more likely to be expected and any change in their environment 
will tend to have a different impact on them (Pascual, 2007). Therefore, this study uses a micro-econometric 
model, specifically a multinomial logit model (MNLM). Its aim is to explain actual producer behaviour and 
the heterogeneity of their individual behaviours in a scenario regulated by the CAP and the CMO for wine.
3. Material and methods
Sample and variables
This paper uses data from wine-growers’ declared preferences in the Castilla-La Mancha Vineyard Register 
for each one of their plots (art. 8, 8/2003 Law of March 20th, on Vineyards and Wine from Castilla-La 
Mancha; GoE, 2003). The Vineyard Register is a tool for supporting the administrative management which 
considers the data relative to each holding. Both the ‘Estatuto de la Viña, del Vino y de los Alcoholes’ (Statute 
on Vines, Wines and Alcohols) and its Regulation (GoE, 1970) already considered in their articles 133 ff. 
in the constitution of a ‘Catastro Vitícola y Vinícola’ (Vineyard and Wine Register). At the EC level, the 
Council Regulation No 2392/86 of 24 July 1986 (EC, 1986) established a community Vineyard Register and 
the Commission Regulation No. 649/1987 (EC, 1987) laid down detailed rules for the establishment of said 
register. The region studied here is Castilla-La Mancha (Spain). However, following Recasens (2003) and 
Barco (2003), each wine region is susceptible to being analyzed through the same scheme; the results will be 
diverse but basically generalizable given the homogeneous behavior of producers as rational economic agents.
But as Sartori and Robledo (2012) point out, models estimated only from declared preference data can lead 
to unrealistic predictions. Therefore, the sample was completed with revealed preferences (Brownstone 
et al., 2000; Page et al., 2000; Train and Wilson, 2008). The units of analysis are the plots rather than the 
producers given that the producers make different decisions for each of their plots as indicated by Jiménez et 
al. (2001). The database includes 74,502 plots out of the 617,071 plots in the Castilla-La Mancha Vineyard 
Register for 2012 (https://www.jccm.es). They were selected by stratified random sampling, the study plot 
population was divided into the groups corresponding to the alternatives of the endogenous variable, that is, 
abandonment (646), planting (7,296), grubbing up (23,518), restructuring (8,007) and status quo (35,035). 
A quota was assigned to each of these groups through proportional allocation according to the size of the 
population. Simple random sampling was carried out in each stratum so that all the plots would have the 
same probability of being selected, therefore preventing information bias.
This reduction does not imply any significance problem for the results, firstly because it represents, as a 
whole, a sample error of 0.3% for finite mixtures. Individually, each of the categories of the dependent 
variable is also representative of the total population according to the sample errors that were obtained: 
3.6% for abandoned plots, 1.1% for planted ones, 0.6% for grubbed up plots, 1% for restructured plots and 
0.5% for those which remained unchanged.1
Second, it exceeds the minimum size of fifty observations marked by the asymptotic properties of maximum-
likelihood estimators in a MNLM, (McFadden, 1974). It also surpasses the number of observations required 
by category and group of exogenous variables, established at a minimum of ten observations per exogenous 
variable in the endogenous variable category having the least representation (Schwab, 2012; Starkweather and 
1 Abandoned (n=646 and N=5,452); planted (n=7,296 and N=56,497); grubbed up (n=23,518 and N=222,259); restructured (n=8,007 and N=60,402); 
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Kay, 2011). In our case, since there are 14 exogenous variables (13+ the independent term), there should be at 
least 140 plots. Yet our minimum number of plots in the least representative category (abandonment) is 646.
Therefore, a cross section is formed that is suitable to be treated by the MNLM. The specified variables are 
shown on the following table (Table 1).
The dependent variable consists of each of the alternatives which a vineyard farmer can opt for. These 
options are abandonment, planting, grubbing up, restructuring or staying the same, which are the regulatory 
instruments for vineyards in the EU established by the CMO for Wine (CMO, 2002). As shown on Table 1, 
it is a discrete variable which takes value 0 for plot abandonment; 1 for planting; 2 for grubbing up; 3 for 
restructuring; and 4 for status quo.
The independent variables are diverse and have been classified as previously indicated into five groups:
1.  Structural variables. This section consists of size, destination of production, year of action, innovation 
and inscription in the regulatory council. 
2.  Market variables. Here the price of grapes and the price of exports are included. 
3.  Geographical variables. These variables are classified into two groups: the areas of designation of 
origin and the population.
4.  Social variables. These include type of owner, type of holding, and land tenure system.
5.  Public Regulation reflected in CAP subsidies.
Table 2 includes the descriptive statistics of the continuous exogenous variables and the frequencies of the 
discrete variables.
The (mean) statistics on Table 2 (continuous variables: descriptive) show that within the action periods (AA) 
the year 1986 was the most dynamic, which was due partly to the expectations raised by the entry of Spain 
in the EEC (Arnalte, 2007). The mean reference price of wine (MRPW) has a mean value during the period 
under analysis of 2.54 euros/hectograde, a value slightly higher than the national mean. This difference widens 
during seasons of lower production. In the year 2012, there was a difference of 0.54 euros/hectograde more 
for Castilla-La Mancha (MAGRAMA, 2005). The mean unit price of wine exports (MUPWE) is 0.52 euros/
litre lower than the national mean for bulk wine sales. This difference has been increasing in recent years 
while Castilla-La Mancha has been adapting to the disappearance of distillations. In 2012 the price was 1.21 
euros/litre in Spain, (OEMV, 2012). The mean population (MPOP) of the towns where the plots are located 
is close to 7,000 inhabitants; in Castilla-La Mancha 96% of all the towns have a population of under 10,000 
inhabitants (INE, 2013), which in the sample represents 93.5%. Regarding CAP aid (MCAP), the provincial 
mean since 2000 is 58.5 million euros, 59% of the provincial mean for the rest of Spain according to data 
from the FEGA (FEGA, 2013).
The analysis of Table 2 (discrete variables: frequencies) shows that farmers’ majority decisions (CSITDE) 
after not changing the status quo (47%) were grubbing up (31%) and restructuring (11%). The size (NSUPER) 
of 66% of the plots is less than 10,000 m2. The production (CDESPR) from 72% of the vineyards was 
destined to QWpsr. Innovation techniques have been applied (INNOVA) in 11.65% of the plots, a number 
that coincides with the vineyards that underwent restructuring. Farmers registered in the regulatory council 
(CTPINS) reach 46% of the total. The plots located in a DO area come to 96.4%. In 95% of the cases, farmers 
who utilise the land (TIPEXP) are induvial. In 97% of the cases, the owners (TIPPRO) are also individuals. 
And regarding land tenure system (CREGTE), in 75% of the cases the land is their own property.
Functional form of the model
A MNLM was used to develop the research, as in papers by Geta et al. (2013), Ayuya et al. (2012) and Velandia 
et al. (2009), in which farmers choose the alternative J that gives them the greatest utility. In this research, 
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Table 1. Table 1: Definition of the dependent and independent variables of the model logit.
Variables Typology Description
Dependent
CSITDE discrete Plot situation: 0 abandonment; 1 planting; 2 grubbing up; 3 restructuring; and 4 Status 
quo prepared by the authors using data from the 2012 JCCM Vineyard Register (Council 
of Castilla-La Mancha Communities)1.
Independent
Structural
NSUPERF discrete Plot surface area: 1 (≤10,000 m2); 2 (>10,000 and ≤100,000); 3 (>100,000). Prepared 
by the authors using data from the 2012 JCCM Vineyard Register (Council of Castilla-
La Mancha Communities1).
CDESPR discrete Destination of production: 1 QWpsr; 2 Wine from the land; 3 Table wine. EC Regulation 
No. 479/2008 (EC, 2008). Prepared by the authors using data from the 2012 JCCM 
Vineyard Register (Council of Castilla-La Mancha Communities1).
AA continuous Year in which the situation of the plot began. Prepared by the authors using data from 
the 2012 JCCM Vineyard Register (Council of Castilla-La Mancha Communities)1.
INNOVA discrete Innovation: 1=innovation; 0=no innovation. A plot is said to innovate when it has wire- 
trained vines and improved grape varieties. Prepared by the authors using data from 
the 2012 JCCM Vineyard Register (Council of Castilla-La Mancha Communities1).
CTPINS discrete Plot registered with the Regulatory Council: 1 if it is registered; 0 if it is not. Prepared 
by the authors using data from the 2012 JCCM Vineyard Register (Council of Castilla-
La Mancha Communities1).
Market
MRPW continuous Reference price of grapes (€/hectograde) in the central region. The central region is 
limited to a series of towns. The remaining towns from the sample take the price of the 
closest town from the central region, the town least distant in kilometres. The variable 
is calculated as the average price of grapes from 2005 to 2012. Prepared by the authors 
using data from SEVI, 2005 to 2012 (Semana Vitivinícola, a winegrowers’ journal2).
MUPWE continuous Unit export price of wine (€/litre). Calculated as the quotient between the exported wine 
value and the volume. It is the mean provincial price from 2000 to 2012. Prepared from 
data from OEMV, 2012 (Spanish Wine Market Observatory3).
Geographical
DO discrete Plot belonging to a Designation of Origin area: 1 if it belongs and (0) if not. Prepared 
by the authors using data from the 2012 JCCM Vineyard Register (Council of Castilla-
La Mancha Communities1).
MPOP continuous Average population of the town from 2000 to 2012. Data from INE (Spanish Statistical 
Office4)
Social
TIPEXP discrete Type of operator: 1=individual; 2=legal entity.
TIPPRO discrete Type of owner: 1=individual; 2=legal entity.
CREGTE discrete Tenure system: 1=ownership; 2=leased/sharecropping (prepared by the authors using data 
from the 2012 JCCM Vineyard Register) (Council of Castilla-La Mancha Communities1).
Regulatory
MCAP continuous Mean aid received in the period from 2000-2012 in euros. The mean was calculated 
for each province. Average calculated from data from FEGA (Spanish Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund5).
1 Available at: https://www.jccm.es.
2 Available at: http://www.sevi.net.
3 Available at: http://www.oemv.es/esp/-oemv.php.
4 Available at: http://www.ine.es.
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planting; Y2: grubbing up; Y3: restructuring; and Y4: remaining unchanged). The aim was to explain the 
probability of each category depending on the group of observed co-variables X = {x1, x2, ..., xi},where 
i=13. That is to say, the aim was to adjust a model of the form pj (x) = P [Y = Yj | X = x] fj (x) ∀ j=0, ..., 4, 
for each vector x of observed values of the explanatory variables X. Therefore, the estimated formulations 
will provide a set of probabilities for the five alternatives (J+1) from which a farmer having X individual 
characteristics can choose. The covariables follow a multinomial distribution with probability parameters from 





 pj (x) = 1.
To construct the MNLM, (k–I) logit transformations were considered, defined as depending on a reference 
category, in this case Y4. Therefore the generalised logit transformations were defined as: 
                    pj (x) Lj (x) = ln [             ]   ∀ j=0, ..., 3                    p4 (x) 






βsj xs = x’ βj
∀ j=0, ..., 3, for each vector of values observed from the explanatory variables x=(x0, x1, x2, ..., x13)′ where 
x0=1 and bj=(b0j, b1j, ..., b13j)′ are the parameter vector associated to the Yj category. The β coefficients are 
estimated by the maximum-likelihood method.
After estimation, the model will be validated by means of the Likelihood Ratio Test and the pseudo coefficients 
of determination (McFadden, Cox&Snell, Nagelkerke, Count R2). Finally, the significance of the variables 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables of the specified multinomial logit model.1
Continuous variables: descriptive
AA MRPW MUPWE MPOP MCAP
Obs. 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502
Mean 1,986 2.5444090 2.2297 6,929.076 5.85e+07
Std. Dev. 23 0.1847888 0.2846211 8,384.903 3.99e+07
Min 1,900 2.3709 0.9324641 5.538 350,990
Max 2,012 3.39766 2.429253 161,515.1 1.24e+08
Discrete variables: frequencies
Code CSITDE NSUPERF CDESPR INNOVA CTPINS DO TIPEXP TIPPRO CREGTE
0 646 66,723 39,804 2,658
1 7,296 48,942 53,750 7,779 34,698 71,844 70,674 72,300 55,585
2 23,518 25,187 4,702 3,828 2,202 18,917
3 8,007 373 16,050
4 35,035
Σ 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502
1 AA= year; MRPW = reference price of grapes; MUPWE = unit export price of wine (€/litre); MPOP = mean population size; 
MCAP = received aid; CSITDE = plot situation; NSUPERF = plot surface area; CDESPR = destination of production; INNOVA = 
innovation; CTPINS = plot registered with the Regulatory Council; DO = Designation of Origin; TIPEXP = operator; TIPPRO = 
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was analysed jointly and individually. A group validation was obtained, as pointed out by Long (1997), with 
the Wald statistic and the LR test. The individual significance of each independent variable was analysed 
with the P-value associated with the z-distribution. The impact of each explanatory variable on the dependent 
variable will be interpreted through the marginal effects. Marginal effects have to be accounted for separately 
for each category of the dependent variable.
The STATA 12 econometric software (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA) was used to obtain statistical 
and econometric results.
4. Results
This section shows the results obtained from the estimated MNLM, with a sample of 74,502 observations. 
The observations disaggregated by alternatives are: abandonment 646 plots; planting 7,296 plots; grubbing 
up 23,518 plots; restructuring 8,007 plots, and remaining unchanged 35,035 plots. First, the model was 
validated and then the significant variables in the model were ascertained.
Regarding the validation of the model, the estimation of the multinomial logistic regression was obtained after 
nine iterations using the Newton-Raphson method. On the whole the model is significant with a probability 
associated with the Global Likelihood Ratio Test of zero (Prob>chi2=0.0000). This result is supported by 
the fit indicators: R2Mc =0.60 (excellent fit); R2Cox&Snell=0.773 (high fit, near the upper boundary; (ln L̃0)2/N 
=0.91; R2Nagelkerke =0.845 (a value close to 1). Besides, the MNLM provides a 70% higher prediction level 
(Adj Count R2) than the highest frequency of the sample. Therefore, in 70% of the cases the prediction 
derived from the logistic regression model would be right (Table 3).
Furthermore, the goodness of the model is verified by the likelihood ratio estimation (Table 3). The number 
of cases correctly predicted, 62,763 total plots, appears along the main diagonal of the matrix. It was 84.24% 
of the sample, a number that shows the goodness of the model.
We continued with the combined significance of the model through the Likelihood-ratio and Wald tests, 
tests for independent variables. As observed on Table 3, both tests showed similar results (Long, 1997) and 
rejected the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the exogenous variables are simultaneously equal to zero 
since, with a confidence interval of 100, all variables were significant. Finally, the MNLM was validated 
with the Hausman test of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Table 3). All five alternatives have 
negative coefficients, which, according to Hausman and McFadden (1984), is common for this type of tests. 
They conclude that this shows the necessary evidence that the independence of irrelevant alternatives was 
not violated, so that the null hypothesis of IIA was likewise accepted. In conclusion, it verified that the model 
is well specified. Finally, we focused on the individual estimate and significance (Table 4).
We analysed the results of the estimation using the categories of the dependent variable: abandonment, 
planting, grubbing up, restructuring and status quo, this last being used as the base category. 
Abandonment
With regard to abandonment, the smallest plots (NSUPERF) are most prone to it due to their lower level 
of profitability. Plots intended for production of table wine (CDESPR) are the ones that have experienced 
most abandonment; these being the most common in the region. At present (AA) abandonment of a plot is 
the least likely option. Innovation and technical change (INNOVA) are not present in the abandoned plots. 
Normally abandonment is linked to plots of unirrigated land, a long useful life and with head-pruned vines. 
The biggest drop occurs in seasons of low grape prices (MRPW) and therefore a less profitable crop, a 
result that has a clear effect on the short term expectations of the producer. By contrast, the price of wine 
in the international market (MUPW) is less influential in the decision to abandon. Being in a DO area has 
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Table 3. Diagnoses – evaluation model.
Log likelihood=-36,257.766 (iteration 9)
Base outcome=4
Log-Lik intercept only: -91,429.826
Log-Lik Full model: -36,257.766
LR chi2(50)=110,344.12; Prob>chi2=0.0000
Pseudo R2=0.6034
ML (Cox-Snell) R2: 0.773; Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) R2: 0.845




Likelihood-ratio Wald tests 
chi2 df P>chi2 chi2 df P>chi2
NSUPERF 177.926 4 0 176.672 4 0
CDESPR 2,910.332 4 0 1,719.674 4 0
AA 72,316.893 5 0 14,768.996 4 0
INNOVA 19,597.566 5 0 6,937.924 4 0
CTPINS 2,910.732 4 0 2,237.418 4 0
MRWP 135.753 4 0 135.356 4 0
MUPWE 40.395 4 0 37.196 4 0
DO 576.684 4 0 348.053 4 0
MPOP 88.550 4 0 88.763 4 0
TIPEXP 68.442 4 0 64.897 4 0
TIPPRO 98.915 4 0 97.936 4 0
CREGTE 670.112 4 0 621.35 4 0
MCAP 149.390 2 0 136.869 4 0
Hausman tests of IIA assumption (N=74,502)3
Omitted chi2 df P>chi2 evidence
0 -97.216 33 – –
1 -1.2e+03 33 – –
2 -541.783 33 – –
3 -119.002 33 – –
4 -1,094.697 31 – –
Likelihood ratio. Correctly predicted cases 
pred_
choice
0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 6 1 0 0 35 42
1 1 559 102 301 90 1,053
2 3 4,918 22,591 1,803 694 30,009
3 2 1,076 77 5,680 289 7,124
4 634 742 748 223 33,927 36,274
Total 646 7,296 23,518 8,007 35,035 74,502
1 NSUPERF = plot surface area; CDESPR = destination of production; AA= year; INNOVA = innovation; CTPINS = plot registered 
with the Regulatory Council; MRPW = reference price of grapes; MUPWE = unit export price of wine (€/litre); DO = Designation 
of Origin; MPOP = mean population size; TIPEXP = operator; TIPPRO = owner; CREGTE = tenure system; MCAP = received aid.
2 H0: all coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0.
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differentiation of quality. Plot owners in Castilla-La Mancha are very reluctant to leave (CREGTE). The 
option of definitively abandoning the cultivation of vines with or without obtaining financial aid or replanting 
rights is the least likely, since it would mean a capital loss (MCAP).
Planting
With regard to the planting category, the results of the model show that the size of the plot (NSUPERF) 
does not have excessive influence when it comes to carrying out planting, possibly because it is not so 
geared towards increasing competitiveness, nor it is associated with financial support or administrative 
restrictions. As for the destination of the production (CDESPR), the importance of table wine prevails due 
to its better performance in terms of yield and adaptation of the grape variety. Over the most recent years 
(AA), more dynamic planting, associated with a greater degree of innovation (INNOVA) was observed. 
Higher grape prices (MRPW) and the higher export price (MUPW) are significant in making the decision 









NSUPERF -0.3777215*** -0.0004644 0.1752252*** 0.5060231***
(0.1399474) (0.039878) (0.0383997) (0.0482814)
CDESPR 3.09756*** 0.0498769** -0.5615843*** 0.1807192***
(0.1516839) (0.024188) (0.0241528) (0.029624)
AA -0.046084*** 0.1860118*** 0.2881561*** 0.1832233***
(0.0955732) (0.0021109) (0.0024812) (0.0026866)
INNOVA -1.32855** 2.10372*** -2.46045*** 5.14439***
(0.7236203) (0.08734) (0.1572926) (0.0887803)
CTPINS 0.0080845 -0.0380567 -0.0812698** 2.28329***
(2.18e-09) (0.0420916) (0.0403093) (0.0584437)
MRPW -2.38149*** 0.3327845*** -0.3232281*** 0.5118017***
(0.4788038) (0.0983089) (0.1011016) (0.115763)
MUPWE 0.2016144* -0.3066293** -0.6495867*** 0.1644401
(0.1194986) (0.1498377) (0.1359153) (0.2250356)
DO 0.5675078*** 1.91491*** -1.04461*** 2.61186***
(0.1220812) (0.2258258) (0.1366729) (0.2492616)
MPOP -0.0000128 0.0000224*** 0.0000172*** 9.21e-06***
(0.1516839) (2.82e-06) (2.83e-06) (3.12e-06)
TIPEXP 0.0812888 -0.1754093* 0.4599622*** -0.0116506
(0.4562126) (0.1091514) (0.1022304) (0.1286273)
TIPPRO 0.0741402 0.2104598* -0.2321033* -0.9780544***
(0.5225937) (0.1328757) (0.1306718) (0.1626933)
CREGTE -1.77612*** 0.0365987 -0.6604744*** -0.084878*
(0.1853053) (0.0414341) (0.0415891) (0.0521772)
MCAP 1.01e-08*** 1.10e-08*** 5.69e-09*** 6.96e-09***
(0.0000139) (1.05e-09) (9.68e-10) (1.49e-09)
Cons 85.74217*** -374.58970*** -570.81290*** -373.23300***
(4.745932) (4.237612) (4.956957) (5.424165)
1 Standard errors are in parenthesis.
2 *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
3 NSUPERF = plot surface area; CDESPR = destination of production; AA= year; INNOVA = innovation; CTPINS = plot registered 
with the Regulatory Council; MRPW = reference price of grapes; MUPWE = unit export price of wine (€/litre); DO = Designation 
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to plant, contributing to an increased profitability of the crop. Planting takes place mostly in DO areas, due 
to the wide area they cover coupled with the potential added value that production there could acquire. The 
plots located in municipalities with the largest populations (MPOP) are more dynamic when it comes to 
planting tasks. Producers in these municipalities have greater competitive advantages over other areas since 
their increased economic activity results in increased availability of resources, infrastructure and services, 
such as access to wineries and input supplies. Planting is promoted by the owners of the plots (TIPPRO), 
and more by companies than by individual owners, because they usually have more entrepreneurial culture 
and economic resources. 
Grubbing up
With regard to grubbing up, it is larger plots (NSUPERF) that are most prone to it because either renewing the 
vines or switching to another crop allows for greater profitability. The plots that produce table wine (CDESPR) 
are least likely to be grubbed up because most of region’s wine is produced to this end and as a result of the 
expertise with which this is done it produces the best domestic results. The plots where the least innovation 
occurs (INNOVA) are the most grubbed up. Being registered with the Consejo Regulador (Regulatory Board) 
(CTPINS) does not induce the grubbing up of plots, since although the majority destination of production 
is table wine, wines that are finally classified as DO and bottled as such have higher added value. The price 
of grapes (MRPW) is crucial the decision to grub up, the result obtained being that the lower the price the 
more the grubbing up. The export price (MUPW) influences the decision to grub up since the international 
market is the main destination for the table wine production and this has expanded greatly in recent years. 
The municipalities with the biggest populations (MPOP) show greater dynamism in terms of grubbing up 
because producers have greater competitive advantages. The reticence towards grubbing up on the part of 
producers in Castilla-LaMancha (CREGTE) is contributed to by their receiving certain economic measures 
that involve income maintenance (MCAP). In this regard there are also certain intangible factors in play 
related to cultural and family values, combined with a lack of profitable crop alternatives. Regarding those 
who manage the land (TIPEXP), companies grub up more than individuals because they usually have more 
entrepreneurial culture and the economic resources to restructure the business and/or make more profitable 
use of it.
Restructuring
Restructuring is carried out on larger plots (NSUPERF), which allow producers to increase productivity by 
achieving economies of scale. Plots producing table wine (CDESPR) are the ones which have most undergone 
restructuring. This is because of the need to find an outlet for the large volumes of wine which previously 
ended up being distilled and which have now to be exported in bulk, without DO, PGI or having the grape 
variety identified. The plots in DO areas have a positive correlation with restructuring. This is because the 
majority of the plots in the region are located in DO areas, though not all wine produced there receives the 
DO label, as is evident from the fact that a large part of the region’s production is table wine. Innovation 
and technological development (INNOVA) are present in the restructured plots. In part, this is due to the 
application of norms which regulate financial assistance for the restructuring of vineyards. Market conditions, 
particularly the price of grapes (MRPW) are critical to the decision on restructuring. Thus, a price increase 
directly encourages the decision to restructure since this system of cultivation enables a boost to yield along 
with lower production costs. Also regarding market conditions, the export price on the international market 
(MUPW) is less important than the grape prices when it comes to restructuring. Plots in municipalities with 
the largest populations (MPOP) show greater dynamism with regard to restructuring due to their greater 
competitive advantages. Wine producers in Castilla-La Mancha (CREGTE) are reluctant to restructure due 
to the costs involved and, especially, due to the limitations on irrigation. More owners (TIPPRO) take the 
decision to restructure than renters (TIPEXP). There are more owners than renters or other types of ownership 
of vineyards. CAP (MCAP) financial assistance is an important stimulus for restructuring. We complete 
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It should be noted that an increase of 1% in the size of the plot has a high impact on vineyard restructuring 
probability (1.5% increase) and on status quo (1.9% fall). The effect is not significant on any of the remaining 
alternatives. Moreover, large, more professionalized producers are revealed to be more prone to modernizing 
their holdings. Plots destined for table wine production are the ones that have been most often restructured 
and least often grubbed up. The importance of table wine still predominates in new plantings (according to 
the results of marginal effects, the likelihood of planting increasing is 1.6% with every passing year). The 
most recent years are the ones when more movement has taken place toward planting, grubbing up and 
restructuring. Abandonment is currently the least probable option. With every passing year, new planting is the 
option most likely to occur (1.6%) whereas the likelihood of maintaining the status quo in the plots decreases 
(-3.3%). Therefore, the consolidation of holdings and a stable regulation framework favor structural changes. 
Innovative plots were less prone to being abandoned or grubbed up. Rather, there was innovation in those 
which are newly planted or restructured. According to marginal effects, innovating farmers’ are most likely to 
decide for restructuring (65%). Being registered in the Regulatory Council stimulated restructuration (8.9% 
according to Table 5) and the opposite occurred for grubbing up and maintaining the status quo (-6.7%). 
With regard to market variables, the higher the price for grapes, the more motivation for farmers to plant 
and restructure and the less to abandon and grub up. The alternative most likely to occur after a 1% increase 
in price is planting, with a 3.3% increase. The status quo in the plots can also change by almost 3% after an 
increase in price. This reveals the importance of the economic variable as a determining factor in farmers’ 
decisions regarding their holdings. The price of wine on the international market was less important than 
the price of grapes in farmers’ decision making. Grubbing up and the status quo are worth highlighting; 
according to marginal effects a 1% increase in price results in a 2.9% decrease in grubbing up and a 4.9% 
increase in the status quo. This effect reveals a clear trend in farmers to take exporting as a profitable point 
of reference and as the pillar of the economic viability of holdings, underlined by the fact that the ones who 
focus on international markets when it comes to making decisions regarding their holdings are the most 
active and dynamic farmers. In terms of geographic variables, the majority of the sample plots are located 
within a DO area (96.4%; Table 3). Planting and restructuring are predominant as opposed to grubbing up. 
According to marginal effects, the probabilities of planting and restructuring increasing in PDO areas are 











NSUPERF -0.0000707** -0.0028089 0.0074532*** 0.0153123*** -0.0198859***
CDESPR 0.000547*** 0.0073592*** -0.0270093*** 0.0062552*** 0.0128479***
AA -0.0000153*** 0.0162302*** 0.0122395*** 0.0045277*** -0.0329822***
INNOVA -0.0001948*** 0.0637108*** -0.0641998*** 0.6541154*** -0.6534315***
CTPINS -0.0000134 -0.013529*** -0.0080629*** 0.0893657*** -0.0677604***
MRPW -0.0004249** 0.0330704*** -0.0178348*** 0.0151008*** -0.0299114*
MUPWE 0.0000462*** -0.02745** -0.0291254*** 0.0071769 0.0493524***
DO 0.000072*** 0.1003191*** -0.093655*** 0.0319352*** -0.0387609**
MPOP -2.88e-09 2.10e-06*** 6.69e-07*** 1.77e-07* -2.94e-06***
TIPEXP 0.0000138 -0.0199295** 0.0226292*** -0.0004595 -0.002254
TIPPRO 0.0000164 0.0256674** -0.0105458* -0.0305056*** 0.0153676
CREGTE -0.0003065*** 0.0076283** -0.0311279*** -0.0016944 0.0255004**
MCAP 1.47e-12 1.03e-09*** 1.96e-10*** 1.66e-10*** 1.46e-09***
y 0.00017569 0.11183567 0.04949867 0.03130968 0.80668028
1 *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
2 NSUPERF = plot surface area; CDESPR = destination of production; AA= year; INNOVA = innovation; CTPINS = plot registered 
with the Regulatory Council; MRPW = reference price of grapes; MUPWE = unit export price of wine (€/litre); DO = Designation 
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10 and 3% respectively. This shows that a territorial reference label guarantees production and commercial 
invigoration and encourages farmers to take action.
Plots located in towns with large populations are more dynamic in terms of planting, grubbing upand 
restructuring. On the other hand, in the least populated towns there was a higher probability of abandonment. 
With regard to social variables, farmers in Castilla-La Mancha are very reluctant to grub up and restructure, 
owners being the ones who make that decision. From the viewpoint of the agents who profit from the 
holdings, legal entities who are not land owners are the ones who promote grubbing up. As to regulatory 
variables, aid from the CAP is an important element in farmers’ decision making, which is revealed by its 
significance for all the alternatives (except for abandonment according to marginal effects; planting is the 
course of action of choice when aids increase, which reveals the high impact of subsidies on the decision 
to grub up and start new planting).
The analysis of the influential variables in each of a producer’s alternatives led to the creation of the following 
plot categories: abandoned, planted, grubbed up and restructured plots. An abandoned plot corresponds to 
a small plot (<10,000 m2) with no innovations, whose grapes are destined for table wine, it located in small 
towns, grape price is low and has received subsidies. In a newly planted vineyard the size of the plot is 
irrelevant, there is innovation, the destination of production is table wine, the size of the town is irrelevant, 
grape prices are high and aid is important. Legal entities are more prone to planting. Grubbing up takes in 
large plots of where there is no innovation, the production is for table wine, the location is in larger towns, 
market prices are low (for grapes as well as exports) and aid is received. As for owners, neither individuals 
nor legal entities are inclined to grub up, particularly legal entities. Finally, a restructured plot is a large 
plot which innovates, grapes are destined for table wine, it is located in more highly populated towns and 
market prices for both grape and exports are high. Similarly to grubbing up plots, all types of owners are 
reluctant to choose this alternative.
Summing up, the weight of each variable affects producers’ decisions, but the final decision is derived 
from the interaction of the whole of these variables, and not so much from the specific individual weight 
of any one of them. It is true that there are variables that turned out to be significant in all the alternatives. 
Destination of production (CDESPRO), year of action (AA) and innovation (INNOVA) were significant 
in structural variables; reference price (MRPW) in market variables; belonging to a DO area (DO) in 
geographical variables; and aid from the CAP in regulatory variables. Ultimately, farmers decisions are not 
easy to predict; hence the complexity of the analysis we have carried out.
Then, we assessed the most probable alternative for a plot in Castilla-La Mancha using (1) all the plots from 
the sample, and (2) a standard plot whose characteristics are the average mean value of each of the exogenous 
variables of the sample. For all the plots from the sample (74,502), the most probable alternative was to 
remain unchanged with a mean probability of 0.47 (Table 6). For the standard plot, the option of remaining 
unchanged was also the most likely one with a probability of 0.8067.
Therefore, the results in relation to the variables that affect winegrowers’ decisions were similar to the 
results obtained in previous research. Giannoccaro and Berbel (2011) studied how the CAP reform would 
affect farmers’ decisions on the use of water and they noted the importance of considering multiple factors 
simultaneously in their choices. Structural factors related to the size of the holding, interest in adopting 
innovations and belonging to agricultural groups, such as DO are specifically worth noting. Market and 
economic variables also affect decisions, in this case mainly through prices. Geographical and social 
variables are noteworthy depending on the location of producers. Finally, aid and subsidies received by the 
winegrowers were also important. Therefore, when it comes to designing agricultural policies, economic 
aspects have to be considered, but social and environmental ones are also important because of the effects 
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5. Discussion
Based on the analysis and results of the estimation, the conclusions contribute new elements that are 
complementary to most previous papers regarding potential structural imbalances. Regardless of the structural 
characteristics of the plots, the basic variables which affect producers’ decisions are market variables such 
as the price of grapes and regulation variables such as CAP budgetary aid for grubbing up and restructuring 
and conversion (R&C).
However, from the market variables viewpoint, the cost of exporting wine is not necessarily that important 
since producers do not take it as a direct reference in the decision strategy for their vineyards. In this study 
no relationship is observed between the price of exportation and the development of vineyards in the EU, 
including in Castilla-La Mancha. On the other hand, in countries outside of the EU supply is closely related 
to the market and tends to adjust to variations in price. The inexistence of a significant relationship could 
be due to the measures applied in the EU under the CMO for wine.
From the structural viewpoint, there is a clear dichotomy between the actions of large and small holdings, 
as indicated above in the MAGRAMA report (2005). The former are much more inclined to modernise 
(R&C) (Gallego, 1996) but they also give priority to grubbing up, whereas small holdings have a greater 
probability of being abandoned. The same thing happens in the Autonomous Community of Navarre, where 
large holdings have higher survival rates than small ones (Aldanondo and Casanovas, 2009). This is what is 
generally the case in the agri-food sector in other geographic contexts as well (Montagut and Dogliotti, 2008).
Furthermore, there is also a dominant structural variable with a clear tendency towards the concentration 
of vineyards in those areas with a denser amount of wine crops. It is in the areas featuring more vineyards 
where producers have decided to invest in modernising their vineyards and in new plantations. Studies of 
the Rheinland-Pfalz region in Germany (Bogonos et al., 2012a,b) and on the Priorat region in Catalonia, 
Spain (Bove, 2012) produce arguments along these same lines. The objective is to take advantage of the 
wine-growing potential in these areas. Innovation plays an important role in these new plantations and 
especially in restructured and converted holding. Producers feel that new plantations should be accompanied 
by changes and innovations to improve their competitive position, as established in the Council Regulation 
Table 6. Prediction of the probability of occurrence of each of the farmer’s decision alternatives: abandonment; 
planting; grubbing up; restructuring and status quo.
Alternative1 
0 1 2 3 4
Predicted probabilities for all plots in the sample
obs 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502 74,502
mean 0.0086709 0.0979303 0.3156694 0.1074736 0.4702558
std. dev. 0.0377504 0.1053838 0.3664378 0.2444321 0.442035
min 5.50e-11 5.38e-10 1.19e-13 3.14e-10 0.0002215
max 0.7516627 0.8278624 0.9948151 0.9837361 0.9999548
Predicted probabilities for a standard plot, while all other variables are held constant at their mean
probability 0.0002 0.1118 0.0495 0.0318 0.8067
95% conf. interval 
(confidence 
intervals by delta 
method)
[0.0001; 0.0003] [0.1063; 0.1174] [0.0461; 0.0529] [0.0291; 0.0345] [0.7995; 0.8139]
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No 479/2008, Article 11, item 3 (EC, 2008). The same thing has happened in the community of Castilla-Leon 
in the Toro Designation of Origin (Sanchez, 2003), in the Aragon region (Government of Aragón, 2010) and 
in the wine producing sector of Priorat (Bove, 2012).
On the other hand, the R&C process is probabilistically closer to taking place in areas having a DO and/or PGI 
than in areas where there is no territorial denomination. The same process happened in Aragon (Government 
of Aragón, 2010). Therefore, this geographical variable, as well as market positioning, affect producers’ 
decisions. However, new plantations have also been significant in terms of the potential tendency to choose 
these areas for their location. These new plantations, according to the report by the Basque Government 
(2012), would interfere with the quality objectives pursued by DO areas, since part of the objectives are 
obtained through a control of the vineyard surface area as well as of the conditions of production.
6. Conclusions
This paper studied winegrowers’ decision making processes in Castilla-La Mancha in relation to public 
regulation in matters of structural changes in vineyards. The results show that farmers are faced with a 
complicated, ever-changing scenario and that their decisions are not easily predictable.
In this scenario, the typical farmer from Castilla-La Mancha is generally more likely to adopt the decision 
of not carrying out any action in their vineyards. Grubbing up comes in second, restructuring and planting 
are found farther behind while the likelihood of abandonment is practically zero. Giannoccaro and Berbel 
(2011) also state that the majority of EU farmers declared their intention not to introduce any changes in 
their holdings.
However, the model has shown that the provision of public aid and guaranteed prices stimulates investment 
on the part of farmers to expand their production capacity, exactly as Winter (2002) also suggests. As 
pointed out in the results analysis, the marginal effects studied reveal interesting conclusions in terms of 
winegrowers’ behavior; the economic variables focused on price (both grape price and average export 
price) are decisive for farmers to decide on modernizing their holdings. Along the structural dimension, 
larger holdings are more prone to opt for adding technological advances and changing production methods 
to reduce unit costs (restructuring and reconversion). Differentiation in production origin is an important 
element to prevent farmers from deciding to abandon and grub up vineyards, which validates the European 
DO and geographical indication labelling as a key element of wine policy in relation to other regions in the 
world. Finally, we have observed that the incentive of public aid favors farmers’ decision to move forward 
and decide on abandonment and grubbing up or new planting.
Therefore, is would be safe to conclude that the effects of this potential measure, coeteris paribus the 
other factors and other EU actors, could affect farmers’ income through prices and this would increase the 
probability of abandonment and grubbing up. Taking into account that the probability of abandonment in 
Castilla-La Mancha is practically null and that of grubbing up is low, the effects of this potential measure 
are much more limited than what could be deduced a priori from a structural measure of this type, mainly 
due to the high probability of Castilla-La Mancha farmers maintaining the status quo in their plots (with a 
probability of 0.8067 according to the logit results). Therefore, agricultural policies have different effects 
and different degrees of impact because they are conditioned, as has been observed, by structural, market, 
geographic and regulatory variables. The results by Giannoccaro and Berbel (2011) are along the same lines. 
Therefore, this paper has aimed at improving research on farmer choices – a quite complex but at the same 
time highly appealing issue – both from the methodological and experimental point of view (Beckford and 
Barker, 2007; Bigliardi and Dormio, 2009; Fortuin and Omta, 2009).
Furthermore, general patterns of behavior can be anticipated using the same methodology and an interesting 
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so-called authorisations for vine planting (EU Regulation No. 1308/2013 (EC, 2013b)) would cause in the 
wine growing sector to substitute for previous rights in the CAP reform for the 2015-2020 period.
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